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New Media in the Arab World:  
A Tool for Redesigning Geopolitical Realities 
 
 
Rabie Barakat 
 
 
Abstract 
  
 
This thesis highlights the role of new media in shaping public discourse and redesigning 
geopolitical realities in the Arab World. It examines the interrelation between media and 
politics as revealed by the Arab popular uprisings that swept away regional status quos in 
2011. New media in general and Al Jazeera in particular were able to foster public 
dynamics and control their trajectories. The result was an introduction of the public sphere 
as an active player in shaping political realities and reconstructing the Arab World on 
different grounds. The new power formula also introduced media-sponsoring states as key 
players in the region. Qatar was greatly able to expand its leverage through “organic 
intellectuals” hosted by Al Jazeera to take part in the interactive discourse with the public. 
Moreover, the media effect created a turbulent stage with open possibilities, thus allowing 
foreign states to intervene in molding the new scene and drawing its horizons. Media 
escalation triggered an uncontrolled domino effect which threatened national identities and 
regional balances. It enticed previously contained dynamics in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, 
and Bahrain; and when developments broke loose from all restraining factors, as in the case 
of Libya, soft power was replaced by military intervention and the domestic character of 
the Libyan uprising gained international dimensions and was further complicated. The 
thesis presents an analysis of the phenomena uncovered by the media-politics interchange 
and finally suggests that new media will maintain its presence as an influential intruder in 
shaping the dialectical interplay between regional players in the foreseen future. 
   
 
Keywords: Public Sphere, Media Discourse, Constructivist Approach, Transnational Organic 
Intellectuals, Geopolitical Realities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1- Situating the Thesis 
In 2011, popular uprisings in various Arab states underscored the crucial role of 
new media in shaping perceptions, mobilizing masses, and orienting the course of 
exploding dynamics within Arab societies. Throughout these events, media tactics have 
been used to serve campaigns for popular mobilization or even long term social 
engineering. This was facilitated by the huge upgrade in media technology coupled with the 
expansion of new media and social media in the field of transnational politics. Little 
wonder, then, that actual revolts and bloody wars stretching from Yemen to Libya were 
fought side by side with massive efforts seeking to shape public opinion and catalyze (or 
control) the tide of change. Political permeability was reaching a new zenith in terms of 
speed and outcomes and the domino effect was sweeping away regional status quos. At this 
point, the Arab World seemed to be stepping into a new age, where media was not just a 
formulator of opinion but an actual intruder in drawing the road map for different political 
possibilities. 
New media in the Arab World has provided popular uprisings with momentum, yet 
the evolution of events on the ground has played a counter role by reshaping media’s 
approach itself towards political changes. This thesis aims to problematize the relationship 
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between media and political developments before concluding that the dialogical interplay 
between both results in a reciprocal effect, whereby each has the tendency to shape the 
other depending on the different contextualizing variables. Such variables range from the 
geopolitical significance of the states witnessing uprisings, to the structures of their 
regimes, their social compositions, and foreign policy calculations on the regional level. In 
other words, the thesis will be proving that new media was able to “reshape the background 
assumptions of Arab views”1 then cultivate social dynamics in the Arab World, yet it was 
by no means far from the aftershocks of political developments. In fact, it was part of the 
same “nested game” and thus could not have escaped the reverberations of its own regional 
milieu. 
 
1.2- Research Questions 
How did Al Jazeera and Al Arabia reflect the foreign policies of Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia towards popular uprisings in the Arab World? The answer to this question requires 
investigating the general guidelines underlying the diplomatic approaches of Doha and 
Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is a state known to have a conservative foreign policy with little 
interest in shaking the regional status quo. According to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its 
foreign policy is a realist one “represented by avoiding slogans and overacting” since the 
                                                          
1
 Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, Iraq, Al Jazeera, And Middle East Politics Today  (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006) p.132. 
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latter “negatively affect the security and stability of the Arab World”.2 For the past decade, 
it has identified itself with a regional order based on the alliance of “moderate” 
dictatorships aligning with the United States, and has “responded to an age of revolution by 
leading what many now call a regional counter-revolution”.3 Riyadh’s policy towards the 
uprisings was founded on the aforementioned approach. Its stance has evolved with the 
evolution of the uprisings, and has thus shifted from taking a defensive position to adopting 
an offensive one, when preserving its regime security required this change. The Saudi-
sponsored network Al Arabia reflected this policy with all its curves and turns, and was 
taking part in the Arab public discourse on these grounds. Its stance was defensive when 
KSA’s allies, namely the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, were threatened 
by popular revolts. However, it was provocative in the cases of Libya and Syria, with both 
being the Kingdom’s main Arab foes. 
On the other hand, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website states that the Gulf 
emirate is “keen on effectively participating in all issues and challenges that confront the 
gulf region”4. This “effective participation” could also be witnessed on the level of the 
Arab World in general, where Doha uses its vibrant public diplomacy in order to preserve 
its place as a key player in regional conflict resolutions. Qatar also uses this diplomacy to 
engage with the Arab public sphere and shape its dialogue in a manner that best suits 
                                                          
2
 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Policy Website. Accessed September 11, 2011. 
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/SITES/MOFAEN/ABOUTKINGDOM/KINGDOMFOREIGNPOLICY/Pages/KingdomPolic
y34645.aspx. 
3
 Marc Lynch, Foreign Policy, “Saudi Arabia’s Counter Revolution”, August 10, 2011. 
4
 Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website. Accessed in September 15, 2011, 
http://english.mofa.gov.qa/details.cfm?id=13. 
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preserving its regional role. Al Jazeera is described to be the main tool for achieving this 
purpose. Ever since the channel’s launching in 1996, it has been extending its influence in 
the field of public discourse. After the eruption of popular uprisings, Al Jazeera enhanced 
its interactive engagement with Arab communities and participated in drawing the 
trajectories of political change throughout the Arab World. It was actively driving for 
further popular escalation in all the states witnessing upheavals except for neighboring 
Bahrain. The network’s editorial policies were an exact reflection of Qatar’s foreign policy 
towards the issues in concern. 
How was Arab new media a tool for redesigning geopolitical realities? The 
dramatic development of events introduced the dilemma of preserving countries having 
diverse social compositions, in the absence of safety valves traditionally offered by central 
authorities. Such were the cases of Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The uprisings were targeting 
the states’ authorities, and at the same time widening the rift between different social 
groups. New media was the dynamo of all Arab uprisings. It was accused by the targeted 
autocracies of carrying out veiled agendas aiming to reconstruct the region on different 
grounds. In Libya, the regime immensely employed this rhetoric. It exaggerated fears 
relating to the tribal components of the Libyan society, the East-West sensitivities, as well 
as the rise of monarchic and fundamentalist groups. The battle between the regime’s 
propaganda outlets and Arab networks, mainly Al Jazeera and Al Arabia, was taking the 
course of discrediting Tripoli’s allegations. However, the states waging media war against 
the Gaddafi regime were benefiting from its collapse and creating a replacement holding 
tight relations with them. Qatar in particular was a key player in redesigning future Libya. 
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Its role was first established through Al Jazeera’s powerful public engagement, and through 
the manufacturing of Libyan organic intellectuals aired regularly on the network to 
comment on the events of the uprising and later on to be key players in the after Gaddafi 
regime. Qatar’s engagement was further boosted after providing the rebels with financial 
and military support. However, Al Jazeera’s engagement was a necessary prerequisite for 
Doha’s subsequent intervention. 
 
1.3- Methodology 
The thesis uses constructivist as well as realist explanations to interpret media 
coverage of Arab uprisings. It relies on both schools of thought to analyze media tactics in 
the context of grand strategies. It also uses comparative analysis in order to elucidate the 
distinctions between Al Jazeera and Al Arabia, and between the foreign policies of their 
sponsoring states, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
The research employs a variety of qualitative research tools. It makes use of 
empirical observations and daily interactions with news industry. It employs visual material 
extracted from accessible archives and other sources of social media, and relies heavily on 
videos uploaded on Youtube. It uses both, primary and secondary literature. It is backed up 
by the wide array of articles published in Arabic and Western papers and journals on the 
subject, and bases its analysis on the available literature pertaining to media and politics. 
The thesis also uses personal interviews conducted in Beirut, Cairo, and Ben Ghazi 
to back up its assumptions. The interviews include Ghassan Bin Jiddo, a key figure in the 
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world of Arab media who resigned from Al Jazeera after accusing the channel of presenting 
biased coverage of the uprisings, a former consultant of Yemeni president Ali Abdallah 
Saleh, in addition to a former Libyan minister, the vice president of the National 
Transitional Council representing Libyan rebels, and several Libyan activists. The 
interviews pertaining to Libya were conducted during its popular uprising. They present a 
close inspection of relevant political developments and shed light on the evolving pattern of 
events. 
 
1.4- Mapping the Thesis  
The thesis is made up of five chapters. The next chapter presents a “genealogy” of 
new media in the Arab World, explaining how this field has developed and evolved. It 
focuses on the distinctions between Arab new media and its counterparts in the West, 
before presenting the map of the main news oriented satellite televisions until the year 
2011. The chapter also introduces the idea of adherence between editorial policies of media 
outlets and foreign policies of their sponsoring states, and explains how the coverage of 
past events has exposed this relation. Moreover, it sheds light on social media as a 
complementary tool for satellite networks, especially noticed during the Arab uprisings. 
The third chapter uses comparative analysis to reveal the differences in news 
coverage between the two main media outlets in the Arab World; Al Jazeera and Al Arabia. 
It analyzes the main drivers behind the policies carried out by each network, explaining 
how Al Jazeera reflects Qatar’s dynamic character and public diplomacy strategy, while Al 
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Arabia mirrors Saudi Arabia’s preferred maintenance of the regional status quo. The 
chapter also presents the main tactics used by each network to gain leverage; Al Jazeera 
through its vital engagement with events and creation of “transnational organic 
intellectuals” and Al Arabia through its extensive coverage and veiled politicization of 
news. Furthermore, it reveals how these strategies and tactics were used during the 
Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, and shows how the stances of Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
towards the uprisings were drawing the line of coverage for both. 
The fourth chapter analyzes the domino effect of the uprisings, unfolding in Syria, 
Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya. It emphasizes the role of geopolitics in rearranging media 
priorities and redrawing their approaches, and links this reassessment to the sectarian 
composition and social structures of Arab communities. The chapter uses Libya as a case 
study to show how media discourse has the tendency to introduce military action, and to 
incorporate international powers in a local dispute. It also sheds light on the specificities of 
the Libyan dictatorship when compared to its Arab counterparts, and establishes its 
interpretations on idiosyncratic, state, and system levels of analysis. The research mainly 
highlights Al Jazeera’s role in the uprising to unpack the layered interaction between media 
rhetoric and social dynamics, and to show how their interconnectedness was driven by 
both; constructed images of social evolution and realist policies. Both schools of IR 
(constructivism and realism) are used to explain the phenomenon and underscore the 
different trajectories of the discourse in concern, with special emphasis on media’s 
constructivist role framing inter-state relations in the Arab World. 
  8 
The last chapter presents general conclusions and findings. It relates the overall 
analysis to IR theory, and introduces the author’s anticipations relating to the role of Arab 
new media in the foreseen future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  9 
CHAPTER 2 
ARAB NEW MEDIA: AN ACCUMULATING POWER 
 
2.1- Introduction 
The literature pertaining to Arab new media and its political functions relates to the 
fact that most news outlets are extensions of regional governments or global powers aiming 
to spread state interests or ensure regime survival. Profit making criteria and a 
public/private dichotomy do not hold the same significance as they do in the West, and the 
state rather than market forces represents the main player in this field.
5
 Understanding the 
background of this status requires tracing back the evolution of new media in the Arab 
World since its early beginnings. 
This chapter examines the launching of Arab satellite channels that presented 
around the clock coverage of events in the second half of the 1990s. Since then, new media 
gradually established itself as a space for public discourse with reasonable margins for 
discussing realities and alternative possibilities on the Arab scene. However, such margins 
were restricted by various considerations. Restricting factors ranged from tight regulations 
adopted by Arab authorities to censorships practiced by their state apparatuses on media 
coverage. Moreover, they pertained to the fact that the Arab public sphere in the post-
globalization era was still in a process of formation, with little malleability to adapt to new 
                                                          
5
 Mamoun Fandy, (UN)Civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab World, (London: Praeger, 2007) pp. 
5 – 8. 
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forms of information exchange or readiness to reconsider inherited perceptions and break 
established taboos. This gradual process of unleashing social potentials, and tendencies to 
redesign public discourse in the Arab World, was to a far extent introduced by new media. 
Its profound impact on shaping the framework of social and political dialectics rendered 
satellite networks a credible platform for discussing alternative possibilities on the Arab 
stage. However, up until recently, it was widely believed that satellite networks have given 
Arabs “the opportunity to discuss hardships and exchange answers, but not to offer 
solutions”,6 and that “viewers may well change their minds because of something they see 
on television but this might not effectively translate into political action”.7 The following 
sections will be examining the evolution of Arab new media basing on all these 
assumptions. 
 
2.2- State Sponsored Networks 
The comparison between Arab media and its Western counterpart invokes several 
questions. It is useful to raise the issue pertaining to the extent of influence that each exerts 
on its respective state policies. In the post cold war era, the term “CNN effect” denoted the 
ability to influence government decisions through extensive live coverage of certain events 
on the international scene. While American networks (notably CNN) were able to trigger 
                                                          
6
 Khaled Al-Hroub, Arab Media in the Information Age, (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies 
and Research, 2006) pp. 90, 91. 
7
 Adel Iskandar and Mohammed El-Nawary, Al Jazeera How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World 
and Changed the Middle East, (Cambridge Center ,2002) p. 55.  
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American action in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and other places, Arab news media remained 
mainly connected to political agendas, and sustained its position as an executive tool for 
political decisions rather than an independent factor triggering political change within states 
or their foreign policies. Thus, policy change has always been induced in the opposite 
direction, where realignments or redistribution of power within Arab ruling elites have 
resulted in modifying the content presented by state sponsored networks.
8
  
To some scholars, Arab new media can be categorized according to the extent of 
autonomy from conventional patterns of government-controlled speech. This margin 
differentiates a channel like Qatari based and funded Al Jazeera from a traditional 
governmental channel like the Syrian, Jordanian or even Qatari national televisions. It was 
notable that the Qatari prince Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani abolished the Ministry 
of Information, responsible for censorship in Qatar. This step was unprecedented by any 
other Arab authority, where all governments include such a ministry or its equivalent.
9
 
However, Arab governments maintain their influence over “liberal” networks (like Al 
Jazeera and Saudi funded Al Arabiya) through legal provisions and dominant 
representation in their boards of directors. Editorial policies are thus bound to express the 
general policy of the state in concern, despite their apparent adherence to professional 
guidelines and objective journalistic standards.
10
 States remain until this moment the 
                                                          
8
 Naomi Sakr, Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life, (London: IB Tauris, 
2007) pp 6 – 8. 
9
 El-Nawary and Iskandar, Al Jazeera, p. 37.  
10
Mohammd Ayishy, “Political Communication on Arab World Television: Evolving Patterns”, Political 
Communication, Volume 19, Issue 2 (April 2002) pp 137 – 143. 
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masters of media monopoly while the private sector and civil society have little to do with 
managing this field. The link between states and media monopoly partially explains the 
reason why media content is shaped within the historical and political contexts of the 
Middle East and the Arab World as we shall see next.  
 
2.3- The Dominance of Transnational Politics in News Industry 
The question of why news agendas in the Arab World have been politicized is also 
an important and legitimate one. The Arab region has been witnessing ongoing turbulence 
for the past five decades, and this has created a sense of affiliation to political causes and 
events within Arab masses, which rendered political news most significant to the general 
public. Media agendas were thus dominated by political news rather than subjected to 
normative standards of selection, while areas of cultural, social, and humanitarian news 
were excluded or given subordinate rank.
11
 
The past two decades in particular were full of dramatic political conditions and 
meaningful events to Arab masses as well: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait followed by the siege 
of Iraq and its devastating humanitarian effects during the 1990s, the Palestinian Intifada in 
2001, the 9/11 attacks against the US and the consequent “War on Terror”, the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, and the Israeli wars waged on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2009. This 
chain of developments added further engagement in politics to a medium which has already 
been politicized and drowned with “Grand Causes”, regional wars and domestic 
                                                          
11
 Ayishy. Political Communication, p 149. 
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disturbances. Arab new media was acting in this context. In a sense, it was an “articulation 
of a common identity”12. It was also gathering all these common grounds and interests to 
“create a collective discourse that raises issues that have meaning to all Arabs”13. For 
instance, Al Jazeera’s coverage of the second Palestinian Intifada reflected Arab views by 
using descriptive terms to which Arab spectators can relate. Palestinians killed by Israeli 
troops were thus described as martyrs and the Israeli army was often termed as “occupying 
forces” in news bulletins.14 However, it was widely believed that such a discourse could 
hardly penetrate local barriers and was deemed to remain passive in terms of effect, and 
transnational in terms of space. Media outlets were thus a complementary tool for inter-
state rivalry and their impact seemed to be more obvious on the regional rather than the 
domestic political scene.
15
 Before the eruption of recent popular uprisings in the Arab 
World, many were skeptical concerning the ability of new media to mobilize masses and 
extend its intrusion towards the local environments of Arab states. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Khalil Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism: McArabism, Aljazeera, and Transnational Media in the Arab World, 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 2006) p 16. 
13 Khalil Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, p. 23. 
14
 El-Nawary and Iskandar, Al Jazeera, p. 53.  
15
 Musa Shteiwi, Arab Media in the Information Age, (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies 
and Research, 2006) p. 131. 
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2.4- Al Jazeera: Setting the “Model” for Many 
If one were to draw a current map of Arabic speaking news channels, s/he would 
notice the rapid growth of such networks within the last fifteen years. The end of 1996 
witnessed the broadcasting of the first twenty four hour dedicated news service: Al Jazeera. 
Rising from the ashes of the newly founded yet insufficiently funded BBC Arabic, Al 
Jazeera achieved great success in capturing wide Arab audience, with its high quality 
around the clock news service. The new born channel made use of an unemployed, well 
trained BBC staff to launch programs that for the first time introduced unconstrained 
political debates with live audience interactivity.
16
  
 Al Jazeera’s success triggered regional as well as international actors to work on 
replicating the experience. Saudi Arabia launched Al Arabiya in March 2003, in an attempt 
to create balance in the media scene. The new network was first regarded as a similar copy 
of the former, only with a more liberal style in presenting and interacting with the audience. 
On the level of editorial policies however, a dramatic divergence between both began on 
the eve of the war on Iraq, when Al Jazeera reflected a wide Arab opinion rejecting the 
invasion, whereas Al Arabiya revealed a relatively pro American stance that overlapped 
with the official Saudi posture. Henceforth, several state sponsored media outlets appeared 
on stage. In 2004, both Washington and Tehran took the initiative. The American Al Hurra 
(The Free) was launched to balance Al Jazeera and redraw the collective Arab opinion, 
especially that relating to the stance towards the United States. It was seen as a tool for 
                                                          
16 Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer, Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime, (London: Routledge, 2004) p 318. 
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propagating American ideals of “democracy promotion” in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, 
though many believe that it has failed to fulfill its objectives. To William Rugh, a former 
ambassador and public diplomacy expert, Al Hurra has simply “struggled unsuccessfully to 
fuse information and advocacy broadcasting”. 17 Iran on the other hand launched Al Alam 
(The World) during the invasion of Iraq. The channel focused primarily on Iraqi, 
Palestinian, and Lebanese audiences. All three constituted environments in which Iran has 
managed to build a firm political presence (Shiites of Lebanon and Islamist factions in 
Palestinian territories) or that demonstrated potential spheres of influence (Shiites of Iraq). 
In 2006, Moscow decided to take part in this media rally: “Russia Today” began 
broadcasting in Arabic in the second half of that year. BBC was relaunched in 2008 from 
London, and France 24 offered a twenty four hour Arabic news service starting 2010. Even 
China managed to place its foot (although generally unnoticed) in this mosaic, with its 
CNTV launched in 2009, whereas Turkey tried to make use of the growing admiration of 
its Erdogan government in the Arab World by establishing TRT Arabic in middle 2010, a 
step that was densely publicized by the Turkish government, with Erdogan himself 
speaking on the occasion.
18
  
On the Arab stage, Egypt has consistently announced its intensions to substantially 
upgrade its governmental media outlets, though little was done in that regard. Abu Dhabi 
Channel previously showed promise, especially during the war on Iraq, and was even 
                                                          
17
 William Rugh, “Repairing American Public Diplomacy”, Transnational Broadcasting Studies, Journal no. 14, 
(Spring 2005). 
18
 This information is offered by the official websites of each of the mentioned channels.  
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competing with Al Jazeera’s coverage. Later on, however, it suffered a significant 
reduction in budget and underwent a gradual transformation from a news network to a 
commercial one, in what seemed to be an attempt from the Emirates authorities to refrain 
from political media engagement. The two main media actors remain Qatar’s Al Jazeera 
and Saudi Arabia’s Al Arabiya; both having full support from their respective governments, 
though not directly owned by either of them. Several other channels of a primarily local 
identity relied on the same type of support system: Iran sponsors Al Manar (launched in 
1991) which is owned by the Lebanese Hezbollah. It also finances Al Quds (2008) and 
Palestine Today (2011), both mainly targeting Palestinian spectators. Several Iraqi channels 
are being funded by Tehran in the same way. Saudi Arabia in turn supports Future TV 
(owned by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri), while Libya has had several 
unproductive attempts (namely Assa’a and Al Ghad) that were distorted due to the lack of 
clear vision or even interest in defining its own media strategy.
19
 
 
2.5- Inter-State Proxy Wars 
The documents published by Wikileaks in 2010 best demonstrate how Arab states 
deal with media content and employ it as a tool of conflict. One is able to notice how Al 
Jazeera offered wide coverage of the “scandalous” documents described as the 9/11 of 
                                                          
19
 The stated information is partly dependent on my work in this field and with several of the mentioned 
networks, particularly Al-Alam, Assa’a, and Palestine Today. 
  17 
diplomacy,
20
 especially that hundreds of them highlighted secret stances and decisions 
claimed by Arab leaders. To Al Jazeera, this coverage strongly adhered to the general 
policy of Qatar in which the small emirate practiced influence through media power. To Al 
Arabiya on the other hand, the conservative political stance of KSA, especially when it 
comes to the Kingdom’s internal affairs, imposed restraints on the network because many 
of the uncovered documents pertained to hardly defendable stances or actions practiced by 
Saudi figures, princes, and high officials. The Saudi network did not show the same 
enthusiasm revealed by Al Jazeera on the issue. Wikileaks was a tool in Al Jazeera’s hand; 
a weapon against Al Arabiya’s sponsoring state. In previous situations, the two channels 
contested more vigorously in propagating antagonistic viewpoints of a given case. During 
the 33-day Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006, Al Arabiya broadcasted reports accentuating 
Israel’s commercial relations with Qatar. On the other hand, Al Jazeera played an integral 
role in bolstering emotions of sympathy and solidarity with Hezbollah (KSA’s unpleasant 
Iranian ally). Both engaged in a fierce rivalry of heavy propaganda and mutual image 
undermining.
21
 
Different battle grounds for Media outlets can be identified throughout the last few 
years. Iraq played a central role in defining Middle Eastern strategies for both the United 
States and Iran. The main purpose of Iran’s Al Alam TV channel was to win the hearts and 
minds of Iraqi Shiites before the United States did. Washington’s Al Hurra contested for 
the same purpose. Turkey’s TRT has been trying to reflect the moderate pro-Arab stance 
                                                          
20
 Italian foreign minister Franco Fratini in a press conference in 28/11/2010. 
21
 Fandy, (UN)Civil War of Words, pp. 60 – 62. 
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that Ankara’s government holds under the rule of the Justice and Development Party. It is 
reaching to Sunni Arabs throughout the Middle East without opposing Saudi interests or 
distorting Riyadh’s strategic perceptions of its regional role.22 The Turkish channel is not 
taking part in satellite wars and is thus representing the strategy carried on by its respective 
government towards regional issues. If Iranian “revolutionary” behavior is mirrored 
through the often aggressive stance of Al Alam, the Turkish “calm diplomacy” can be read 
between the lines of TRT’s editorial policies. 
As for Egypt, the absence of a serious Pan-Arab media project has deprived Cairo 
from engaging in this inescapable media battle. Egyptian authorities tried to balance this 
deficiency through direct and indirect interventions. This explains why Al Alam T.V. was 
banned from broadcasting on Nile Sat (owned by Egypt) in 2009,
23
 and why Egyptian local 
TV channels waged fierce attacks on Al Jazeera whenever the latter reports heavy criticism 
for Egypt’s domestic or foreign policies. 
Not only did Egypt play a role within its national jurisdictions to reduce the 
efficiency of its opponents, but it also managed to promote and sponsor the adoption of the 
Arab Satellite Television Charter in a meeting joining the Egyptian Minister of Information 
to his Arab counterparts in Cairo in 2008. The Charter, legitimizing further censorship over 
media content was signed by all ministers except for the Qatari one, whereas the Lebanese 
minister expressed Beirut’s reservations. It addressed Arab authorities’ demand that they 
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penalize satellite broadcasters who “attack leaders, harm national reputations or air socially 
unacceptable content.”24 The charter’s resort to broad headlines and lack of details rendered 
it a potentially powerful tool. Yet the absence of enforcement mechanisms led many 
observers to believe that it constitutes merely a symbolic gesture with no material powers.
25
 
The absence of enforcement mechanisms on the Pan Arab level has led many 
scholars to highlight the ability of news networks to reflect foreign policies of their 
respective states. Fandy contends that news networks are employed as tools of conflict in 
proxy wars fought between regional actors.
26
 In this sense, regime security seems to be an 
integral drive for media monopoly. Consequently, Fandi notes, the politics-media formula 
is a tool for “authoritarian systems needing some space to breathe if they are to survive”, 
whereby “Arab media serves as a non-territorial lung for all these autocracies and semi-
autocracies”. 27 
 
2.6- Between Professional Guidelines and Political Agendas 
Politicizing news often leads to tilting the balance in favor of manipulation at the 
expense of professionalism. News manipulation can take different forms. It may vary 
within acceptable margins of professional relativity, or exceed those margins to mere 
exploitation of media content. This is due to the fact that objective journalistic guidelines 
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cannot present solutions for each and every case in detail, though they can structure the area 
of maneuver. In this sense, reordering a bulletin according to a certain perception of news 
importance may be acceptable, but eliminating a major event from the whole bulletin run-
order would hardly stand as being professional. 
In an interview published in 2007, former head of BBC’s Arabic service Muhsen El 
Sokkari states that the newly launched Arabic speaking channel would be presenting the 
Arab audience with different news content. The different angle from which the network 
perceives events allows for this differentiation. El Sukkari insists that “the plurality of 
views and perspectives offered is far more than anything that can be seen in the Middle 
East”. The complete neutrality of presenters while conducting dialogues or managing 
debates constitutes an important criterion in sustaining professional credibility. It is also a 
mere reflection of the fact that BBC “does not have a political message”, El Sukkari 
asserts.
28
 
The neutrality advocated by the head of BBC’s Arabic service was lacking in most 
Arabic speaking satellite media channels. Al Jazeera’s slogan “the opinion and the other 
opinion” seems to aim at reconciling between journalistic criteria and hidden political 
objectives. To some critics, the prominent channel may complicate the task of Qatari 
diplomats due to the margin of freedom it reveals, yet it serves Qatar’s long run diplomatic 
interests.
29
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Al Jazeera’s sympathy with Hezbollah during the 33 day war on Lebanon in 2006 
could be read in between the lines of its coverage. The network implicitly portrayed the end 
of the war as a victory achieved by Hezbollah. This was evident through the live shows 
broadcasted from Beirut emphasizing the achievements attained by the Lebanese resistance. 
On the other hand, Al Arabiya’s bias was clearly an expression of the other end of the 
argument. The Saudi channel aimed at emphasizing the degree of destruction caused by the 
war, with no regard what so ever to the actual achievements attained by Hezbollah’s 
military machine. Mirroring Saudi suspicion of armed resistance movements in the region, 
Al Arabiya intended to convey the following message: The war was a defeat when seen 
from the Lebanese side of the battlefield.
30
 
Al Jazeera’s partial preference for Hezbollah demonstrates that a certain 
compromise is being made between professional standards and politicization. This balanced 
compromise was almost absent in America’s Al Hurra, which was more straight-forward in 
revealing its editorial policies. After the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafiq Hariri, the channel’s editorial policy was radically opposed to Syria. On one of its 
talk shows, a Lebanese parliamentarian was urging Arab regimes not to hold Syria 
responsible for the assassination without concrete proof. The anchor replied – on the air – 
with, “Please don’t give me the crocodile tears now”. 31 
Such biased attitudes at Al Hurra were criticized by media scholars and observers. 
Some, such as international editor at United Press International Claude Salhani, were 
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critical of the whole programming schedule of the network, where “they are programming 
cooking shows and documentaries on monkeys during the fighting in Fallujah in Iraq and 
Rafah in Gaza”. 32 Others like former ambassador William Rough, believed that the 
channel “veered too far in the advocacy direction”, and asserted that when a new director 
sought to increase its journalistic autonomy in 2007, he was fired “for giving too much air 
time to Hassan Nasrallah”.33 
Despite major setbacks, some emphasize the development witnessed by the media 
industry, where the main networks seem to have overcome the conventional media 
coverage and “provided new-style journalism that aims at fostering more critical capacities 
among viewers”.34 Either way, what is certain is that politicizing news content pertains first 
and foremost to institutional objectives rather than individual defects and personal 
capacities. The message conveyed to the public through the news, is a result of the interplay 
between overlapping and opposing interests within the sponsoring state. The final form of 
news content is delivered to the recipient who has the freedom to accept it as it is, or to 
subject it to critical review.  
Basing on the mentioned, one can hardly distinguish between the desire to insure 
state interests and that to maintain regime survival. It might be true that foreign channels 
such as Al Hurra, BBC Arabic, and Russia Today are clearly involved in propagating state 
policies, since their regimes are by no means under threat from the Arab World. In such 
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cases, state security and foreign policy are the objects of concern. However, regional actors 
perceive things from another perspective, since the stability of their regimes itself is at 
stake in what is surely the most turbulent region in the world. They used satellite media 
which in turn employed social media as a tool for conflict and shaping the Arab public 
sphere. 
 
2.7- New Social Media and the Public Sphere 
The internet is widely thought of as an “autonomous technology that serves to 
bolster democratic political practices based on the principle of public participation”.35 In 
addition to this contribution to the field of politics, the internet also presents an added value 
to the world of media. While official censorship imposes restrictions limiting the free space 
of Arab new media and its production, cyberspace communication presents a 
complementary tool for news gathering and “opens spaces for alternative news and 
views”.36 In other words, these virtual spaces not only present means for communication 
between their users, but also serve as additional mechanisms for gathering information and 
introducing diverse angles and approaches for controversial issues. Thus, one could assume 
that they overlap with both fields; media and politics. 
A number of internet tools for political activism exist. Blogs are given credit for 
“liberating journalists from political and economic restraints of global media organizations” 
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and keeping “the Internet’s first promise – to give publishing power to whoever wants it”.37 
Their interactive attributes distinguishes them from static websites. Their media and 
politics related roles range from their usage as a free space for publishing news, covering 
events, and posting critical overviews of politically related issues and figures. 
Youtube has established a parallel world of news reporting; in which each citizen 
can contribute to documenting events by simply uploading taped videos on the cyber 
network. Footage filmed by mobile phones and uploaded on the internet could then be 
broadcasted on satellite television. In a sense, every individual holding a phone becomes a 
potential cameraman. The outcome is the emergence of “citizen journalists” or “grassroots 
journalists”.38 This has certainly presented an added value to mainstream media since it 
resolved the problem of geographic proximity in the case of sudden crises, security 
considerations in danger zones, and political pressures banning or restraining the work of 
field reporters. 
Facebook represents a virtual community where activists are given space to 
coordinate their efforts through groups and other sorts of electronic pages, as well as rally 
support for causes, organize events, and even launch social and political movements. It also 
provides alternative grounds for a vital public discourse, unrestrained by conventional 
censorship or concrete limitations. Facebook maximizes the efficiency of lobbies and 
support groups. It is the main tool on the internet that could be used for coordination and 
cooperation purposes. 
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Finally, Twitter is a form of micro blogging which is useful for establishing a 
network of high pace circulation. It signifies the ability to circulate thoughts and breaking 
news between activists at a fast rate, thus vitalizing their dynamics and allowing speedy 
outcomes. Twitter provides the best means to trace the news of other individuals and follow 
up with their opinions regarding current affairs. It has proven to be especially efficient for 
activists in times of dramatic developments requiring quick reactions and the ability to 
spread fast news. Fast circulation of news is the main attribute of Twitter. It was not 
surprising that in 2011, tweets mentioning an earthquake in Virginia were faster than the 
earthquake itself.
39
 This constituted a perfect advertizing promotion for Twitter
40
, one that 
no doubt accentuates the mentioned attribute. In that same year, Twitter has contributed to 
different kinds of “earthquakes”, ones that have shaken the social and political platforms of 
Arab communities. 
All these aspects led some commentators to describe the latest Arab uprisings as a 
“war between tanks and Twitter”, where the “propagandist state TV slugged it out with 
tweeters, bloggers and Facebook friends on a virtual battlefield”.41 They also gave activists 
high confidence in the outcomes of their cyberspace dynamism. Following the fall of 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Wael Ghonim, the creator of the first Facebook page 
credited for enticing the popular upheaval in Egypt, replied to CNN’s Wolf Blitzer 
concerning his expectations after the downfall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt by 
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simply saying: “Ask Facebook”.42 Statements and slogans praising social networking were 
often raised in demonstrations and mentioned by activists, analysts and politicians. 
Regardless of the validity of such optimism, it is doubtless that cyberspace communication 
has become an integral part of the media-politics formula. 
New social media has reserved a place in the worlds of media, public discourse and 
politics. Its influence stretched to all fields that media is involved in. Many observers have 
underscored how the instantaneous nature of social media, “unlimited by publication 
deadlines and broadcast news slots, explain in part the speed at which these revolutions 
have unraveled”.43 These assumptions lead to another field of debate relating to the 
structural transformations of the Arab public sphere. The latter may be defined in terms of 
“active arguments before an audience about issues of shared concern”.44 It has been argued 
that such transformations could not have been reached without the rise of ICT (information 
and communication technologies). ICT have been credited for their contribution to 
democracy and participatory politics; both being manifestations of the new Arab Public 
sphere.
45
 Indeed, the link between ICT (social media being one of its expressions) and 
democratizing trends is almost undisputable. 
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The discourse evolving through the internet has revolutionized politics and 
enhanced its dynamic character. It has found its base in the process of 
“informationalization” brought about by the ICT.46 Information was no more restricted to 
state actors and their media apparatuses. Instead, it became a product of popular efforts or 
even individual ones. Thus, the digital revolution has established solid grounds for the 
development of unconventional public debates. The public sphere was reformulating in 
accordance to these new intruding factors. New media was not far from this shift in 
collective perceptions and conceptual paradigms neither was the realm of politics and the 
world of political action. 
The appeal for democratic change in the Arab World evolved in this context. It was 
growing rapidly along with the intensified broadcasting of televised images from the states 
in concern and with the expanding usage of social media by political activists. Satellite TV 
channels and social media outlets (both as tools and manifestations of the globalized era) 
have played a major role in accentuating calls for democratic change on the Arab stage and 
in pushing forth the process of this transformation. Both were involved in the debates 
surfacing public discourse during the process of transformation in Tunisia and Egypt. Later 
on, when the tide of peaceful change seemed to be reaching a dead end in Libya, Syria, 
Yemen, and Bahrain, the discourse intensified even more between millions of individuals 
reflecting antagonistic social forces. The blurry lines separating media and politics became 
once again a substance for debate. New variables seemed to be constituting the entangled 
                                                          
46
 Chamsy El-Ojeili and Patrick Hayden, Critical Theories of Globalization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 128. 
  28 
formula of democratization, public discourse, social mobility, and political transformation; 
one which by no means could disregard the role of media tools and technologies. 
 2.8- Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the evolving patterns of new media in the Arab World. 
In the following chapters, we intend to unravel the interconnectedness characterizing the 
relationship between new media and regional politics, by explaining how each factor 
affects the other and making use of the Libyan crisis as a case study. We will be exploring 
the extent of influence practiced by media outlets, and the “tools” and “techniques” used to 
maximize this impact. Yet before we highlight that area, we will be comparing between the 
coverage of two news networks with the widest audience in the Arab World: Al Jazeera Al 
Arabiya. Basing on our comparative analysis, we will be illustrating how each has been 
reflecting the foreign policy of its sponsoring state and its approach towards the sweeping 
change redesigning regional geopolitics. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEDIA DISCOURSE AS A REFLECTION OF 
FOREIGN POLICIES: AL JAZEERA VS. AL ARABIA 
 
 3.1- Introduction  
The previous chapter sketched a map of the main satellite channels occupying 
media space in the Arab World. A brief genealogy of Arab new media was presented in 
order to offer “the possibility of thinking through new media’s relationship to the past”.47 It 
furthermore explained how satellite channels act mainly as conduits for inter-state tension 
and rivalry. This chapter examines media’s coverage of the recent popular uprisings 
sweeping across the Arab World. It undertakes a comparative analysis between Qatar’s Al 
Jazeera and KSA’s Al Arabia. The chapter confirms the assumption that each has been 
reflecting the foreign policy of its respective sponsoring state towards the most devastating 
Arab developments in decades. 
During the popular uprisings, media outlets were not reacting to foreseen events. 
They were rather acting in response to surprisingly vibrant dynamics, with unexpected 
momentum, high expansion potentials, and shocking outcomes. The unprecedented events 
framing news coverage unveiled the foreign policies of media-sponsoring states more 
clearly, since satellite networks had to generate quick reactions on a daily basis. Media 
strategies and editorial policies were thus being molded during the progression of 
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revolutionary dynamics, and when opposing social forces (siding with regimes or against 
them) seemed to be heading towards a clash, media outlets had thinner margins for 
maneuvering. Maintaining a distance from radical developments became more of a 
journalistic utopia. “Objectivity” remained the slogan adopted by competing networks, yet 
it was merely a cover for constructivist engagements with the uprisings, aiming to play a 
role in shaping their trajectories. The following sections unpack how satellite media 
managed to perform this task. 
 
3.2- Dynamism vs. Preserving the Status Quo 
The previous chapter illustrates how Saudi media outlets (including Al Arabiya) 
tend to encourage preserving the status quo when possible. This strongly adheres to the 
Saudi regime idea of survival, whereby any “revolutionary” regional action can threaten to 
delegitimize the monarchic regime holding close ties with the United States. Qataris have a 
different strategic approach. They are preoccupied with balancing regional powers by 
maintaining an open diplomacy strategy and enhancing media power. Thus, countering the 
influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran’s Islamic credentials requires airing Islamist figures 
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood like Sheikh Yousef Al Qaradawi.
48
 Maintaining 
media leverage is achieved through what some call “McArabism”, which is defined as “a 
new kind of instant nationalism” in which “transnational television channels create a more 
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harmonious Arab public opinion on crucial regional and Pan Arab issues”.49 Articulating a 
common identity and shared positions on Arab and Islamic issues intensifies this Pan Arab 
trend. Al Jazeera acts on boosting such collective sentiments and interacts with their 
manifestations, thus gaining additional leverage and more ability to influence Arab public 
opinion. 
The rapid success of Al Jazeera gave back multiple gains to Qatar. It portrayed it as 
a progressive emirate compared to both monarchic and republican regimes, with an ability 
to interact with public opinion throughout the Arab World. This tendency gave Doha a 
substantial margin of influence and heightened its ability to shape perceptions and orient 
them towards political issues of concern to the emirate. Qatar gained leverage that 
enhanced its ability to harass other regional actors in times of conflict, and elevated its 
capabilities against neighboring Saudi Arabia and other states with regional hegemonic 
tendencies.  
To many observers, Al Jazeera “seeks to be provocative in a region where news 
reporting is often limited to directives from government information ministries”.50 It aims 
to “make sense of an emerging transnational public opinion critical of states and not 
reducible to their interests”.51 Its dynamic character reflects that of Doha. It appears to be 
always on the offensive; taking initiatives rather than avoiding them, and vitally engaging 
with developments instead of reacting to their outcomes. 
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Al Arabia is usually more on the “defensive”. KSA’s cautious character when it 
comes to social mobility explains the network’s stance. Its conservative policy restrains its 
actions and prevents it from involving itself with risky adventures. Of the very few 
offensives launched by the Saudi regime since its birth, was the sponsorship and 
recruitment of Jihadists to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The result was the 
creation of a dynamic fundamentalist network which later on presented itself as a legitimate 
replacement for the kingdom’s regime. Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda is certainly a 
nightmare that the Saudis wish to avoid recreating. Any revolutionary spirit in the region, 
whether it is of a fundamentalist nature or not, threatens the stability of monarchic rule. 
The Saudi kingdom finds difficulty in facing regional tides of change due to several 
factors. The first relates to the shaky social grounds supporting its governing authorities 
whereby wealth and power are mainly centered in the hands of the royal family. The second 
factor is linked to the number of citizens that vastly outnumbers those of Qatar (more than 
20 million as opposed to Qatar’s 200 000 forming a small community that could be easily 
managed). A third factor stems from the weak allure of its Wahabi rhetoric, a weakness that 
the Qataris have tried to overcome by adopting a more moderate version of Islam and by 
sponsoring intellectuals of high profile such as Sheikh Yousef Al Qaradawi who addresses 
tens of millions of Arabs on the weekly religious show broadcasted on Al Jazeera under the 
name Asharia’a Wal Hayat. Popular figures such as Al Qaradawi were hosted regularly 
during the latest upheavals. They constituted part of Al Jazeera’s strategy to extend its 
leverage and deepen its interplay with the events on the ground. Al Jazeera’s reliance on 
transnational organic intellectuals to positively affect the course of the uprisings has 
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reflected Qatar’s vital foreign policy towards regional issues. This interactive approach was 
missing in the case of Al Arabia. 
 
3.3- Al Jazeera: Creating Transnational Organic Intellectuals 
The previous section mentioned how Al Jazeera used credible or popular Arab 
figures as means to increase the level of interaction with the Arab public sphere. This 
sphere was taking the form of a transnational space partly due to domestic repressions and 
partly to the presence of political sponsors “able to take advantage of the new media 
opportunities to invoke a shared identity”.52 Al Jazeera proved to be a successful tool to 
achieve this goal. However, the Qatari network could not only rely on technological 
facilities and editorial policies that frame the wording of news in order to fully engage with 
the vibrant activity of the Arab public sphere. It also needed influential figures capable of 
playing the role of think tanks or “theorists” of the uprisings on the one hand, and catalysts 
and “agents” for mass mobilization on the other. This task was achieved by Arab 
intellectuals that were given the chance to thoroughly analyze political developments, give 
advice to activists, and boost their morale by presenting positive analysis of the outcomes 
of events or even accentuate the religious and moral righteousness of the struggle.  
The Qatari network was actually creating transnational “organic intellectuals”. By 
hosting Arab figures to comment on televised images of the uprisings, it was offering its 
guests access to interact with the discourse on the ground and play a role in directing the 
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course of its evolution. Al Jazeera has thus upgraded the status of its aired figures from 
merely being intellectuals to also being organic and transnational. They were organic in the 
sense that they made use of new media technology to connect with social forces and shape 
their dynamics; and they were transnational in the sense that their persuasive leverage 
stretched beyond national boundaries and invested in the increasing permeability of Arab 
communities and their vital interplay through media outlets and cyberspace 
communication. Transnational organic intellectuals were thus “experts in legitimating”53 
and catalyzing the revolts. They have made full use of media facilities in order to 
communicate with millions of spectators around the Arab World and inspire their 
movement. 
Azmi Bshara and Sheikh Yousef Al Qaradawi were the two main experts 
performing this task. Bshara, the prominent Palestinian academic and politician regularly 
hosted at Al Jazeera to comment on Arab uprisings, overtly defined his role as that of an 
“organic intellectual”54. By referring to Gramsci’s conception of an intellectual, Bshara - 
Ex-Knesset member and an Arab Nationalist of a leftist background - was accentuating the 
importance of effective interaction with the masses drawing the course of events. Sheikh 
Yousef Al Qardawi played a complementary role, whereby his sphere of influence 
stretched deep into various Sunni Islamist factions. Al Qardawi’s impact, especially 
witnessed through the Egyptian uprising as we shall later see - was so powerful that Efraim 
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Halevy, the former director of the Israeli intelligence agency Mosaad, advised Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to initiate a dialogue with the Islamic cleric for peace 
purposes in the region.
55
 In a sense, this constituted an astounding acknowledgment of the 
leverage practiced by such figures. However, this influence was mainly sensed from the 
Egyptian uprising onwards. In the case of Tunisia, the striking development of events was 
so surprising that no state, regime, or satellite network had the chance to fully prepare itself 
to deal with it. 
 
3.4- Al Arabia: Extensive Coverage and Veiled Politicization  
Al Jazeera’s reliance on analysis and extensive engagement with events is not 
replicated in Al Arabia’s coverage. The Saudi network claims that its policy is based on 
providing the audience with information rather than overemphasizing the analytical 
dimensions of the issues in concern.
56
 It gives special importance to leaks and scoops as 
part of the competitive profile it wishes to present. According to its Egyptian anchor 
Mahmoud Warwari, Al Arabia aims to “deliver news to the audience rather than be 
provocative”.57 This coincides with the abovementioned interpretation of the general stance 
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framing its policy, in which it avoids taking initiatives that go beyond news reporting and 
presenting information. 
However, this does not mean that Al Arabia refrains from playing the same game of 
politicizing news. It simply based its approach on different grounds. In a sense, Al Arabia 
aims to formulate public opinion through more conventional methods of news creation. The 
network presents wide coverage and aims to capture the attention of Arab spectators 
through exclusive footage and interviews. In this context, politicization occurs when news 
material is aired after manipulating the proportions of its components. For instance, 
focusing on the insecurities that result from popular uprisings in some states (governed by 
KSA’s allies) comes at the expense of news showing state suppression of demonstrating 
masses. This was evident especially in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Manipulation in this 
case is a result of the network’s overemphasis on certain aspects of the event, and of 
magnifying particular dimensions of the issue while trying to “hide” others. At some points, 
even elimination is used as a means to undermine specific news. The process of elimination 
does not imply lying or fabricating false material. Yet it entails disregarding certain parts of 
the picture, thus drawing imprecise implications in the minds of viewers. 
The selectivity practiced by Al Arabia in structuring its bulletins and choosing its 
broadcasting material does not undermine its position as a major source of information for 
many Arab spectators. The Saudi channel maintains its place in the core of journalistic 
competition as a network capable of presenting rare footage, significant news, and 
exclusive interviews with high-ranking officials. It is important to note that Al Arabia’s 
relatively easy access to conduct interviews with key sources and political leaders in the 
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Arab World is partly due to the fact that it represents the main media outlet reflecting 
KSA’s foreign policy. Saudi Arabia is the richest state in the Arab World, with a central 
political and religious role. Its material wealth and Islamic tutelage derived from the 
presence of the holiest place for Muslims on its soil and its established regional leverage 
are acknowledged throughout the Arab World. This influence drives most Arab states to 
bear its stance towards critical issues into consideration. Thus, when Al Arabia hosts an 
official during times of conflict, the interview itself may reflect a Saudi desire to 
communicate with the network’s guest. This can also be perceived as an opportunity for the 
official himself to send signals or indirect messages to Saudi authorities relating to bilateral 
relations, common concerns, or controversial policies. Al Arabia does not abstain from 
engaging with media discourse. It simply does that with less direct involvement if one were 
to compare it to Al Jazeera. If the power held by the latter as a media force in the Middle 
East is “asymmetrical to Qatar’s actual leverage in the international arena”,58 then this is 
certainly not the case for Al Arabia. The Saudi network partly derives its influence from 
KSA’s central place in the Middle East. In the following two sections, the coverage of the 
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt is examined in order to present empirical evidence of these 
arguments. 
3.5- Tunisia: The First Test  
In Tunisia, the popular uprising was instigated by purely domestic factors. 
Unemployment, political alienation, and corruption were all symptoms of local dimensions. 
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Satellite media had no role in triggering the outbreak of mass protests. Later on, as the 
events evolved dramatically, competition between TV networks became a driving factor for 
intensive coverage. Media power was gradually gaining more significance as regional 
players engaged directly or indirectly in this new game of regime survival. The daily flux 
of events - regularly televised and politicized – deepened the interplay between media 
industry and political developments. At a certain point, it seemed impossible to disentangle 
both levels of activity.  
The Tunisian regime was toppled by a popular revolution that was not preceded by 
previous signs of upheaval. Local authorities were used to dealing with civil unrest with 
decisive security measures. The fact that they kept close censorship on media outlets (local 
and foreign) resulted in the knowledge vacuum they need in order to sustain a total 
blackout. However, the Tunisian regime did not expect that calls for change would be 
transmitted through virtual reality. It was not ready to cope with alternative media, namely 
with the digital mass media of the 21
st
 century. Demonstrating masses were using 
Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and other forms of cyberspace communication in order to 
preserve the vitality of their movement. The Tunisian authorities unsuccessfully tried every 
possible way to thwart the flow of online videos. Internet and power outages were applied 
in various towns,
59
 yet the fever moved from one city to another, and the Tunisian President 
Zeinelabedeen Ben Ali was unable to prevent the contagious mass demonstrations from 
reaching the capital and besieging his own presidential palace. 
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The Tunisian revolt required means of communications in order to insure survival. 
The internet provided these means. It has been the vehicle used by practitioners and 
activists to “foster interchanges that are both alternative in their non-commercial and open-
access format and activist in their practice”.60 Television networks did not have enough 
access to the Tunisian stage because of previously imposed censorship. They made use of 
the videos uploaded by activists on the internet (mainly Youtube) in order to overcome this 
deficiency. Social media here served as both; a catalyst employed by activists for the 
expansion of mass demonstrations, and a breakthrough achieved by news networks, thus 
carrying them into the scene. According to Marc Lynch, social media and satellite 
television were “collectively transforming a complex and potent evolving media space”. 
Without the former, he asserted, “amazing images of Tunisian protestors might never have 
escaped the blanket repression of the Ben Ali regime”.61 
 The continuous broadcast of videos uploaded on the internet (especially by Al 
Jazeera) resulted in a further spread of activist news and intensified media effect. In a 
sense, social media served as the ammunition for news networks, and the latter were the 
machine guns that gave the Tunisian event a wider range of audience. New factions within 
Tunisia were able to follow up with the flood of information (particularly those that were 
not much familiar with the internet). The “media siege” isolating Tunisia from the rest of 
the Arab World dramatically crumbled and the long sustained status quo disintegrated after 
massive raids carried out by media outlets. 
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If we were to relate this scene to the editorial policies of news networks, we could 
understand why Al Arabiya refrained from being as forward as Al Jazeera in its televised 
broadcast. Two main reasons come to mind: The first relates to the conservative policy 
usually undertaken by the Saudis in favor of preserving the status quo, and the second to 
KSA’s explicit support for the Tunisian president which was later on crowned by receiving 
him as a guest after his escape from Tunis. Accordingly, one would understand why Al 
Arabia was being defensive with news relating to the presidential family. Such was the 
attitude towards early information about the arrest of Bin Ali’s relatives.62 One would also 
comprehend why the channel gave more attention to the riots and chaos resulting from 
mass demonstrations rather than the suppression of protestors by security forces. The 
network and its website would thus follow up with news relating to “riots, break-ins, and 
burning of public institutes, banks, and trade companies that have been entirely 
destroyed”.63 It also undermined activist news posted on social networks and give more 
attention to the Tunisian TV and official news agencies, thus describing the events in their 
earliest days as “clashes between citizens”.64 This approach was especially noticed during 
the first days of the uprisings, when the regime’s fate was still unpredictable. The 
sensitivity towards Al Arabia was revealed a few weeks later, when hundreds of Tunisian 
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protestors besieged the channel’s team on the border between Tunisia and Libya after the 
eruption of the Libyan uprising, and demanded an official apology from the network’s 
administration regarding its “insincere coverage”.65  
At the other end of the scene, one could claim that the enthusiasm revealed by Al 
Jazeera from the very first days of the Tunisian uprising was due to its general stance 
regarding political developments in the Arab World. The more it engages in transmitting 
televised images to recipients, the greater leverage it acquires in formulating public 
opinion. This usually differs from one case to another. More extensive engagement is 
noticed when events harm regimes outside the scope of alliance or mutual understandings, 
and more reservation is detected when the case relates to actors that the Qataris wish to 
refrain from aggravating (the popular upheaval in Bahrainis an example of that as we shall 
see later). Either way, when things seem to be moving in the direction of change, the Qatari 
channel usually takes the initiative and holds a seat with other active forces formulating this 
change.  
Contrary to Al Arabia’s coverage of the Tunisian uprising, Al Jazeera relied heavily 
on videos uploaded by local activists on social networks. Activist media became the 
channel’s only resort after banning its field reporters from working on the ground; and 
within a short time, Al Jazeera turned into “the big voice in a multimedia landscape of Arab 
dissent that encompasses bloggers and online social networks”, and thus, according to the 
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Los Angeles Times, its “rapid-paced, visceral coverage of the Tunisian upheaval has 
reverted viewers across the Middle East”.66 
Al Jazeera’s coverage provoked Tunisian authorities and caused them to target the 
channel with intensive attacks. Heavy criticism and accusations were carried out by 
journalists and politicians on behalf of the regime. The head of the Tunisian parliament 
described the channel as an “enemy” of Tunisia, while the parliament accused it of 
promoting violence and destabilizing the country.
 67
 Even the parliament “opposition” 
(which was artificial to a far extent) joined the campaign and charged the network of 
“conspiring” against the country.68 However, this did not stop Al Jazeera. On the contrary; 
it added to its confidence in the choices it made, and later on, drove it to further affirm the 
positive evaluation of its stance and highly estimate its outcomes. This evaluation was 
revealed in an interview conducted with Azmi Bshara by the prominent anchor Yusri Fouda 
on a local Egyptian television, after the collapse of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, in 
which Bshara argued that the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were “unlike any other in the 
history of revolutions”. Bshara went as far as asserting that the number of people 
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contributing to both was “more than the average participants in any other revolution, 
including the Iranian revolution itself”.69 
 
3.6- Egypt: Affirming the Domino Effect  
Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Tunisian uprising revealed Qatar’s desire to vitally 
engage with the daily flux of events. On the other hand, Al Arabia presented a more 
conservative coverage due to the restrictions stipulated by KSA’s foreign policy. In both 
cases, the extent of engagement was linked to the political decision issued by the network’s 
sponsoring state. Such a decision would either push for wide coverage and thus play a role 
in the evolution of events, or simply refrain from doing so, hence indirectly serving the 
regime’s interest in preserving the status quo. This background assumption seemed to 
replicate itself in the case of Egypt with one exception: The unavoidable task of providing 
the audience with wide coverage, even by those wishing to preserve the status quo. 
According to Al Jazeera’s former senior presenter, Ghassan Bin Jiddo, most 
networks meant to avoid the “mistake” they made in Tunisia, where with the exception of 
Al Jazeera, minimal coverage was presented. In Egypt, media players had to choose 
between preserving a line of communication with the targeted regime or “buying a one way 
ticket” to an open media war. Bin Jiddo asserts that Al Jazeera was determined to play a 
central role in toppling Mubarak’s regime. In the case of Al Arabia, he believes that the 
                                                          
69
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACYusZII748&feature=player_embedded (accessed in September 1, 
2011) 
  44 
Saudi network tried to create an acute balance in its coverage, reconciling between the 
concrete developments on the ground and its editorial policies reflecting KSA’s position 
regarding the issue. This would explain why Egyptian officials were frequently hosted by 
the Saudi network to advocate their regime’s image and posture. He adds that the political 
decision is translated on the journalistic level through various means; from around the clock 
reporting of events, to special emphasis on humanitarian dimensions and biased distribution 
of time for aired politicians and analysts. To him, Al Arabia maintained a coverage 
reflecting a sense of denial. Its approach portrayed the “Egyptian regime as potent until the 
very last moment”. 70 
At the beginning of the uprising, Al Arabia’s stance was obvious. The fall of 
Mubarak’s regime implied strategic harm to Saudi Arabia’s regional policy, since the 
former is a major ally in the Middle Eastern “moderate states” axis. On the fifth day of the 
demonstrations, the channel was desperately trying to conceal the extent of escalation 
driven forth by activists. Anchors insisted on saying that protestors were demanding “a 
reform of the regime” then aired the actual footage which clearly shows slogans asserting 
the demand to “topple the regime”.71 Al Arabia followed a route similar to its previous one 
in Tunisia, only with more extensive coverage. It focused on the negative impact of the 
demonstrations especially when it came to “food shortage” and lack of security. It 
highlighted “riots and instability”, airing cries for help from civilians complaining of the 
instability caused by demonstrations. On certain occasions, it reported a “decrease in the 
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number of protestors” in compliance with the official curfew, and broadcasted footage 
taken from the Egyptian national TV of allegedly arrested rioters, with part of the footage 
showing guns, ammunition, and other sorts of weaponry supposedly used by insurgents.
72
 
Al Arabia’s approach to the uprising drove one of its senior anchors, the Egyptian Hafez Al 
Mirazi, to announce an “indirect” resignation on air. He ended his show which was 
following up with Egypt’s events from Cairo by saying: “In the next episode we will be 
talking about the impact of all this on the situation in Saudi Arabia. If this were to happen, 
then Al Arabia is an independent channel. If not, then I thank you and say farewell”.73 As 
one would suspect, this was the last time in which Al Mirazi got the chance to address the 
channel’s audience. 
Al Arabia’s coverage began to adapt with Egyptian developments during their 
evolution, before finally leaving the “sinking ship” in its last moments. Nevertheless, it 
continued to express sympathy with the regime. Even some of its employees coincided with 
this stance. When Mubarak stepped down, the channel’s presenter reading the news showed 
obvious distress.
74
 Later on, Al Arabia aired an exclusive audio message from Mubarak to 
the Egyptian people, in which he denied all allegations and accusations pertaining to 
himself, his family, and his regime.
75
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Al Jazeera’s coverage was diametrically opposite to that of Al Arabia. It was to a far 
extent provocative, and in the opposite direction. Its policy described previously by Bin 
Jiddo was even noticed by foreign media in the early days of the uprising. On January 27, 
12 days after the breakout of protests, the New York Times published a report affirming the 
belief that Al Jazeera was determined to play a role similar to that established in Tunisia.
76
 
The course of events asserted this assessment. Within less than a week from the first mass 
demonstration, the Egyptian situation evolved dramatically. Facebook groups calling for 
protests included hundreds of thousands of members. Local authorities worked on 
controlling the flow of information, and acted to disturb the means of communication and 
coordination between activists. More than twenty million internet users were denied access 
to online information for several days. Al Jazeera was promoting and using material 
displayed on social media outlets whenever possible. The channel’s license was soon 
revoked, and on the 27
th
 of January, the Egyptian satellite transmission company Nilesat cut 
off the network’s signal, totally disregarding the contractual agreement between both. A 
few days later, Al Jazeera’s offices in the country were shut down. Six of its field reporters 
were arrested, yet the network continued to broadcast images it attained from local activists 
and to conduct interviews with political opposition figures, protestors, and eye witnesses 
though satellite phones and land lines after mobile communication was shut down. It aired 
videos uploaded on the internet showing brutal attacks by security forces on civilian 
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protestors. Among those were recordings of police vehicles intentionally running over 
demonstrators,
77
 and others showing unarmed protestors being shot in cold blood.
78
 
Egyptian official press and television came up with paradoxical and irrational 
explanations of the ongoing events, “blaming Qatar, Hamas, Iran, the United States, and 
Israel at the same time of aiming to destabilize Egypt”.79 A girl was shown on Egypt’s 
national television with face obscured “confessing” she was a foreign agent trained by 
Americans and Israelis in Qatar.
80
 Official media outlets were extremely offensive in their 
attacks on demonstrators, accusing them of treason and relating them to foreign agendas. 
On many occasions, they warned of the “horrific consequences" of the revolution. In 
reaction to that, media presenters, writers, and commentators resigned from their jobs and 
joined the protests. A famous presenter declared that she left the studio minutes before 
airing, refusing to read a bulletin that reduces the number of protestors “to less than five 
thousand troublemakers who were on a looting and killing spree”. She could not “bring 
herself to read that lie on air”, she asserted.81 
Egypt’s official media was simply incapable of dealing with the challenge. Its 
approach was the same as that held by other official media outlets in the Arab World; 
giving itself “the status of the guardian of thought and attitudes”, and basing its convictions 
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on the “naive idea that the people are not mature enough to understand life and unable to 
identify either their goals or priorities”.82 They were no match for a vibrant channel like Al 
Jazeera. According to Foreign Policy, Al Jazeera’s giant screen broadcasting news 
throughout the uprisings to hundreds of thousands of Egyptians in Tahrir Square in the 
middle of Cairo “underscored the new reality facing Arab regimes: They no longer control 
the message”.83 
Al Jazeera used all possible means to catalyze popular dynamics in Egypt. The main 
promotion pertaining to its coverage of the Egyptian revolution was given the title “The 
People Triumph”, with a well known patriotic song performed by the late Egyptian 
legendary soloist Um Kulthoum in the background.
84
 It used archival material to draw 
analogies serving specific political implications. For instance, on 6/2/2011, the channel 
recurrently aired a small part of an old interview with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, 
in which the latter advises former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to leave office for the 
sake of “preserving Iraqi blood”.85 The network also aired emotional scenes of social 
dimensions, as part of its “constructivist” approach towards the events. Its live broadcast of 
a wedding joining an enthusiastic couple in the midst of protestors
86
 simply added a touch 
of human intimacy to the grand political scene. Its constant use of provoking expressions 
like “human chains to prevent tanks from moving in Tahrir Square”, created a sense of 
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social solidarity. So did the airing of calls for defiance by young rebels facing tough 
circumstances in the square, like that of the charismatic Nawwara Najm, who broke into 
tears while hysterically crying: “I thank Al Jazeera and the Tunisian people! We broke 
loose from all chains! We let go of all the fear!.”87 Nawwara’s sincere cries were included 
in Al Jazeera’s first promo of its coverage of the uprising. Later on, the channel’s 
prominent anchors joined the stage and cast aside much of their professional restrictions. In 
the last days of the uprising, Jamal Rayyan was presenting a commentary similar to that of 
Abdel Nasser’s famous Sawt Al Arab back in the 1960s. His voice was asserting with an 
enthusiastic tone: “We are witnessing an Egyptian pilgrimage towards freedoms that have 
been sought for over 30 years. Today, we are perhaps witnessing the most sincere 
expression of the will of the Umma”.88  
In parallel, Al Jazeera’s “organic intellectuals” were performing an outstanding task 
in cultivating mass perceptions and inspiring the popular movement. According to the 
Egyptian paper Al-Ahram Weekly, Azmi Bshara was an “ideologue of sorts during the 
uprising” where he “followed the revolution minute by minute from the Qatari capital Doha 
with his think tank – the Arab Center for Research and Political Study – is based”89 (also 
sponsored by Qatar). Sheikh Youssef Al Qaradawi in turn, went as far as performing an on 
air supplication asking for “the victory of the revolutionists and downfall of the regime” 
after being invited to do so by Al Jazeera’s anchor Ali Dafiri, “in response to the many 
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wishes expressed by Arab spectators calling the channel for that sake”. It was an 
outstanding “professional mistake” when Al Jazeera’s other anchor Iman Bannoura 
“confirmed” the supplication’s content by saying “Amin”!90 Days later, after the fall of the 
Mubarak regime, Al Qaradawi delivered a speech before hundreds of thousands at Tahrir 
Square celebrating the outcome of the revolution. Concurrently, the channel was also airing 
pro-regime demonstrations in Bahrain.
91
 The domino effect hypothesis was gaining 
credibility. However, the fall of Mubarak’s regime opened a new chapter in the grand 
picture. It was the moment after which the controversy relating to media coverage was 
shifting to another area, where the question pertaining to double standards became 
legitimate, and where geopolitical considerations intruded in shaping media rhetoric. 
 
3.7- Conclusion 
This chapter unpacked how the coverage of Al Jazeera and Al Arabia mirrored the 
foreign policies of Qatar and Saudi Arabia respectively. It also showed how each reflected 
the specificities of the two states as well as their structural and variable weaknesses and 
strengths during the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. The events in Egypt did not signal the 
end of the domino effect, yet they certainly presented the last of peaceful revolutions and 
quick regime collapses. In other countries, developments moved on a different trajectory 
and satellite media acted in a different context. Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria are far 
from homogenous in their social structure. Instead, they are countries facing possible 
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fragmentation with devastating regional aftershocks. Pessimists went as far as describing 
developments in these states as “a way to the abyss”.92 New circumstances evolved 
carrying new media a further step in its engagement. The latter took part in redesigning 
regional geopolitics and was bearing the consequences of geopolitical realities in turn. The 
next chapter examines these assumptions, taking Libya as a case example. It links the 
aforementioned analysis to theories of International Relations and presents an interpretation 
based on constructivist as well as realist approaches. It also presents idiosyncratic, state, 
and system levels of analysis in order to encompass all factors shaping the discourse under 
study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
NEW MEDIA AND REDESIGNING GEOPOLITICAL 
REALITIES 
 
4.1- Introduction 
This chapter examines how new media is playing a role in redesigning geopolitical 
realities after stretching its influence from local environments of Arab States to the regional 
milieu. Following the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, concerns were echoed 
suggesting that the fundamental and fast paced change in the Arab World was leading to 
uncontrolled regional aftershocks. The sweeping tide of change moved to Libya, Bahrain, 
and Yemen before finally exploding in Syria. In these states, the uprisings evolved in 
parallel routes and added new factors to the media-politics formula. The first factor relates 
to the heterogeneous composition of those countries with regard to their social structure: 
Syria has a Sunni majority and many minority sects to which the ruling class belongs, 
Bahrain of a Shiite majority governed by a Sunni royal family, Yemen of Sunnis and 
Zaidies with a complex tribal social composition, and where Libya is characterized by East-
West sensitivities and deeply rooted tribalism. The communities in Tunisia and Egypt are 
far more homogenous. Almost all Tunisians are Arab Sunnis, whereas Egypt’s Christian 
minority was not related to the ruling class and had little interest in preserving the regime. 
The second element of distinction relates to the fact that all four states were governed by 
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family-regimes whose members were in direct control and command of the army. This was 
not the case in Tunisia and Egypt, where armed forces kept a distance from political 
authorities when the events reached their climax, thus allowing both uprisings to overthrow 
the two regimes with minimum casualties. The third element is a time factor, in the sense 
that the regimes were not taken by the same amount of surprise as the preceding ones, and 
therefore had the chance to use all the strategic cards they hold in their battle with opposing 
social forces. 
The impact of these factors on media and politics will be illustrated in the following 
sections. Al Jazeera will constitute the focal point of our research and analysis since it 
proved to be the most powerful formulator of public opinion during the Arab uprisings. 
How this relation could be linked to IR theory will also be of main concern in our 
presentation of the Libyan case study. 
 
4.2- When Geopolitics Intervenes 
It has been said that “the battle of hearts and minds in the Middle East is being 
fought not on the streets of Cairo, Tunis, Manama or Sana’a, but on the newscasts and talk 
shows of Al Jazeera”.93 It has also been argued that dominant media players (particularly 
Al Jazeera) were acting in accordance with the foreign policies of their respective 
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sponsoring states (Qatar in Al Jazeera’s case)94.  Notwithstanding, the ability of Al Jazeera 
in particular to reconcile between journalistic standards and veiled political agendas 
maintained the network’s credibility among spectators. However, when the tide of change 
reached Bahrain, Qatar’s doorstep, then struck in a state supposedly holding strong ties 
with Doha (Syria), new predicaments presented themselves to Qatari foreign policy, and 
consequently Al Jazeera. In the case of Bahrain, the network kept a distance from the 
uprising and indirectly raised suspicion concerning its “sectarian” drives. While in the case 
of Syria, it reproduced an aggressive stance towards the regime after days of hesitation, in 
what seemed to reflect Qatar’s preferred commitment to support Islamic factions (the 
Muslim Brotherhood in particular) on the expense of Ba’ath rule. Qatari foreign policy 
reflected by Al Jazeera was no more just on the offensive. It rather had to couple its 
initiative role and vital engagement with the uprisings with a defensive strategy similar to 
that of Al Arabia. Such was its stance towards developments in Bahrain. 
In the case of Yemen, Al Jazeera’s task was relatively easy. The channel maintained 
the same pro-revolution coverage it presented during the previous uprisings of Tunisia and 
Egypt. Its engaging approach severely influenced Yemeni public opinion. In an interview 
with the author, Abdel Malik Mansour, former diplomat, minister and advisor of Yemeni 
President Ali Abdallah Saleh, the ex-Yemeni official said he decided to resign from his 
post as the representative of Yemen in the Arab League in reaction to live images he saw 
on Al Jazeera. On Friday March 18, 2011, 53 civilians were killed and several hundreds 
were injured after being shot by pro-regime militants wearing civil uniforms. The televised 
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images of the incident, he asserted, were crucial in shaping his decision and that of other 
Yemeni officials, to support the uprising.
95
 
Al Jazeera accelerated the course of events in Yemen. It articulated Qatar’s stance 
and reflected its public diplomacy strategy which once again collided with that of Saudi 
Arabia. Mansour explained how Saleh was considered to be “the Kingdom’s man in 
Yemen”. Saudi support expressed for Saleh allowed him to cling to power for the longest 
time possible, and prevented a quick collapse of his regime. The opposing foreign policies 
of Qatar and KSA were once again mirrored by the coverage of Al Jazeera and Al Arabia. 
However, the latter was increasingly expanding the space of its coverage. It was determined 
not to lose the race against its Qatari competitor, or at least, to limit its role in shaping the 
Arab public sphere. 
As previously mentioned, Al Jazeera’s coverage in Syria was cold at first. The 
confusion evident in the network’s editorial policy seems due to the undecided standpoint 
of Qatar towards Syrian developments. According to Bin Jiddo, Al Jazeera’s administration 
was waiting for such a decision to be issued. When the Qataris decided to “launch an 
offensive”, escalation was noticed in the network’s coverage. Thuraya satellite phones were 
distributed to Syrian activists and extensive reliance on eye witnesses was noticed. Bin 
Jiddo claims that some of them were opposition figures or protesters not even present in 
locations where demonstrations or security measures were taking place. The “eye-witness 
strategy” employed by Al Jazeera triggered controversy. Critics of the network cited 
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specific examples discrediting this policy, some of which they were able to investigate. One 
example is that of Raja’ Nasser, a Syrian opposition figure who used to go on air in the 
name of Talal Khalidi. On Friday May 27, Nasser was describing the demonstrations in 
Hama – one of the turbulent cities in Syria - as an eye witness, while in fact speaking from 
the Bristol Hotel in Beirut where he was attending a conference. When asked by one of his 
colleagues about the drives behind his act, he replied by saying: “this is a revolutionary 
tactic”. 96 Al Jazeera defended its stance by asserting that it was doing the best it could to 
provide the necessary coverage and maintain precision at the same time. Syrian authorities 
were blamed for prohibiting foreign reporters from pursuing news, and were accused of 
deliberately aiming to disrupt the presentation of the real picture for Arab and Syrian public 
opinion. 
Al Arabiya’s coverage of both the Syrian and Bahraini uprisings was in accordance 
with its political orientation. It was provocative in the Syrian case, accusing Iran and 
Hizbollah with direct involvement, and was regime-defensive in the case of Bahrain. The 
developments in Syria signified a golden opportunity for the Saudies to break Iran’s main 
ally in the Arab World. To Riyadhh, this was its moment to act against Syria. Media war 
was the main tool of battle. Al Arabia magnified all critiques and accusations pertaining to 
Iran and its Lebanese ally. Former Syrian parliamentarian Ma’moun El Homsi sent Al 
Arabia videos in which he accused Hizbollah of sending “merceneries to save the Assad 
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family.”97 When Hizbollah released a statement denying the allegations, its response would 
be marginally referred to during one of the network’s bulletins.    
Bahrain was another intersecting point between Qatar and KSA. In the small 
emirate, Facebook activists published thousands of pictures relating to the bloody 
suppression of protestors in Lu’lua Square, while Al Jazeera aired images of the “calm 
streets of Manama”.98 Shiite mosques were attacked and several of their religious symbols 
were abused. The sectarian rift was increasing, and this presented an excuse for hesitant 
coverage. During the early days of the uprising, Al Jazeera broadcasted part of Al 
Qaradawi’s Khutba, saying the reason why he did not express support for the protests in 
Bahrain was due to their “sectarian drives”.99 Al Jazeera was criticized for not balancing his 
opinion by airing another one that denies or responds to such accusations.  
In the case of Bahrain, Qatari political and security concerns shaped the channel’s 
editorial policies since both monarchies are part of the GCC. Even before protests reached 
Manama, some commentators noted that Doha’s enthusiasm will not undermine 
geopolitical considerations. Hugh Miles argued that the issue is one “of proximity and 
power” and that “despite the channel's exceptional job in covering the turmoil in Tunisia 
and Egypt, the complex relationship with Saudi Arabia is a reminder that even for Al 
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Jazeera, in the Persian Gulf free press has its limits”.100 Surprisingly, what was not aired on 
Al Jazeera about Bahrain was said in a documentary broadcasted on the network’s English 
speaking channel (Al Jazeera English). The film introduced the dilemma as follows: 
“Bahrain, an island kingdom in the Arabian gulf, where the Shiite Muslim majority are 
ruled by a family from the Sunni minority, where people fighting for democratic rights 
broke the barriers of fear only to find themselves alone and crushed. This is their story and 
Al Jazeera is their witness. The only TV journalist who remained to follow their journey of 
hope to the carnage that followed. This is the Arab revolution that was abandoned by the 
Arabs”.101 The film was supposed to be aired again, yet Al Jazeera refrained from doing so. 
If what happened in Bahrain was a real Arab revolution, then it was definitely 
abandoned by many, the US included. Geopolitics intervened to slow down Al Jazeera’s 
enthusiasm for change. The complexity of the situation in the small emirate was due to its 
sensitive location in the Gulf; bordering both Saudi and Iranian conflicting interests. Its 
sectarian composition did not help either. However, if Bahrain presents a case where 
geopolitics intervened to shape media discourse, then Libya was one where geopolitics 
dragged in regional and international involvement. It was also a case where the media 
effect was simply an introduction for hard power alternatives. Several reasons contributed 
to these outcomes as we shall see. Some could be linked to the idiosyncratic regime of 
Moamar Gaddafi, while others could be related to domestic factors and international 
interests. 
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4.3- Libya: From Soft to Hard Power 
The significance of the Libyan case derives from the fact that it expressed several 
dualities; civil protest and armed rivalry, local involvement and foreign intervention, in 
addition to the employment of soft and hard power. The Libyan uprising took the form of 
peaceful demonstrations in the beginning. Former Libyan Minister of Youth and Sports 
Ibrahim Koweider informed this author that he warned Libyan officials in advance of signs 
of upheaval. He said Libyan authorities thought they could contain any uprising with 
preemptive steps like conducting meetings with local citizens to discuss their financial 
demands. “I told them those are not the activists you are looking for”, he said. “The 
uprising will be triggered by youngsters using means you have never dealt with before”.102 
Obviously, Libyan authorities did not take such warnings seriously. Starting the 17
th
 of 
February 2011, the situation escalated dramatically, and media outlets joined the open 
battle field.  
The response of Libyan “Leader” Moamar Gaddafi to international pressures and 
domestic disturbances was different from that of his counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt. The 
high level of violence in reaction to the upheaval in Libya far exceeded that in the other two 
states, thus introducing a protracted armed insurrection and international military 
intervention. The way both scenarios ended certainly did not encourage Gaddafi to walk the 
same path Mubarak and Bin Ali did. However, his approach was not dictated by the failure 
                                                          
102
 Personal Interview with Libyan Former Minister of Youth and Sports Ibrahim Koweider conducted in 
Egypt in June 2011. 
  60 
of previous reactions to popular revolts in the neighboring countries. Idiosyncratic, 
domestic, as well as international factors played a role in shaping this outcome. 
On the idiosyncratic level, Gaddafi’s dogmatic approach to politics explains his 
absolute rigidity towards all initiatives and calls for compromise. His radical perception of 
public affairs and complete certainty of the righteousness of his political project drove him 
to fight the battle of preserving his regime with all possible means. Jerrold Post, founder of 
the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior at the CIA, emphasized 
that personal characteristics are probably the most important aspect in decision making 
when it comes to a leader holding unrestrained power such as Gaddafi. He explained that 
the Libyan leader has a “borderline personality” whereby he “swings from intense anger to 
euphoria”, and “when under stress he can dip below the border and his perceptions can be 
distorted and his judgment faulty”.103 This might explain why he dealt with political 
developments with an exaggerated sense of denial. Gaddafi’s inflexibility could also be 
traced to his radical conceptions of the world cited in the “Green Book” and his other 
“ideological” contributions. According to the late Saudi minister Ghazi Kosseibi who had 
the chance to meet Gaddafi and negotiate him on various occasions, the latter never knew 
the meaning of neutrality. Kosseibi notes that Gaddafi almost acknowledges only “two 
forms of international relations; either instant unity or armed rivalry”.104 
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Gaddafi’s personal characteristics provided media outlets with additional material to 
employ in their attacks. Azmi Bshara commented on Gaddafi’s first speech in which he 
described rebels as rats and himself as “glory” and “history”, by saying: “It would have 
been funny had it not been sad”. He added sarcastically that “usually, such cases need the 
intervention of a psychiatrist in order to extract signs of mental illness. In Gaddafi’s case, 
he is articulating these signs overtly”.105 Al Jazeera even hosted a psychoanalyst to analyze 
Gaddafi’s personality, in which the network’s presenter Khadija Bin Genna gave a long list 
of attributes to his character including the way he dresses, his hair style, his weird stances, 
and his terminologies, before asking if being “crazy” drops penal liability. The psychiatrist 
answered by asserting his belief that Gaddafi’s constant mentioning of “hallucinogenic pills 
used by rebels” in his speeches constitutes a projection of his own condition and 
circumstances on others.
106
 It was no wonder that two months after the eruption of the 
uprising, Simon Tisdall wrote in The Guardian that the “war on Gaddafi is personal, and he 
is unlikely to retreat”.107 
On the domestic level, Gaddafi made use of Libya’s complex network of tribal 
alliances to fight the rebels. These loyalties have been the backbone of his regime for over 
forty years, and have helped him sustain his authority despite economic sanctions and 
several attempts to oust him from power. Gaddafi also played on regional sensitivities, 
enticing fears in the West of the country from alleged separatist inclinations in the East. He 
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also made use of the rebel’s adoption of the old Libyan flag (flag of independence) in order 
to propagate claims about their ambitions to restore the monarchic regime of 
independence.
108
 This is where fears of civil war and possible disintegration were 
exaggerated. It is where geopolitics could have been redrawn on different bases than those 
governing the past. It is also what drove media outlets supporting the rebels (Al Jazeera in 
particular) to underscore the wide support of the revolution in Western Libya, in order to 
deprive Gaddafi of the East-West escalating card.  
At the international level, Gaddafi’s allies (mainly Russia and China) were clearly 
against of his removal. Their stance was evident during the adoption of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973 authorizing the imposition of a no-fly zone and other measures 
against Gaddafi’s forces. Russia’s Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, blamed Western 
states supporting the resolution for any possible “humanitarian consequences”, while State 
Duma vice speaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky said the resolution “did not bode well for the 
prospects of peace in the region”. 109 Conflicting interests on the international level bought 
Gaddafi more time. Yet they encouraged Qatar, the main media state sponsor involved, to 
change its strategy towards the issue, as soft power alone proved to be insufficient to topple 
the regime. 
The Libyan crisis unleashed fierce competition for dominating Arab and Libyan 
public opinion. Despite that, Gaddafi’s regime was slow in reacting to media campaigns 
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and failed massively in countering its rivals with similarly efficient media tactics. It was 
driven by the same mentality that governed its performance throughout previous decades. 
Libya’s official media leaned on an outdated propaganda machine. It shared similar 
characteristics with other public televisions in the Arab World. The Libyan National 
Television launched intensive campaigns during the first weeks of the revolution claiming 
that thousands of protestors were touring the streets of Benghazi (first city in the East to fall 
in the hands of rebels) declaring their loyalty to Gaddafi, and that the leaders of armed 
“vandals and gangs” began fleeing to neighboring Egypt.110 Such claims had little chance 
to influence public opinion, especially in a satellite era where the abundant influx of 
information complicates the task of news manipulation. 
Opposing media outlets used the same efficient techniques implemented during 
previous uprisings: around the clock coverage, extensive use of footage extracted from 
social networks, hosting of opposition and dissident political figures, open air for critiques 
from Libyan citizens, and over-dramatized emphasis on humanitarian conditions. Al 
Jazeera also employed “national organic intellectuals”, in this case Libyan figures, as 
revolutionary catalysts capable of playing a role parallel to that of the aforementioned 
transnational intellectuals. One could notice how Libyan commentators regularly hosted on 
Al Jazeera became key figures representing the rebels. Of those was Mahmoud Shammam, 
the Libyan media expert and politician in exile and previous member of Al Jazeera’s 
administrative board. Shammam, who later became in charge of media relations in the 
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National Transitional Council (NTC), which accused power after the fall of Gaddafi, was 
given all the necessary financial, technical, and logistic facilities by Qatari authorities to 
launch the first Libyan satellite network supporting rebels during the uprising under the 
name “Libya Al-Ahrar”.111 
Another figure was Sleiman Dogha, the young Libyan journalist who used to head 
the media corporation owned by Seif Al-Islam (Gaddafi’s son) in London by the name of 
Al-Ghad. Dogha was viewed to be a young figure representing the new Libyan generation 
that triggered the uprising and shaped its early discourse. Dogha also became part of the 
NTC.
112
 
A third intellectual was Sheikh Ali Al-Sallabi, the Muslim cleric in exile hosted by 
the Qataris since the late nineties and a member of the Global Union for Muslim Ulama 
(clerics) headed by Sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi. Al-Sallabi was one of the “religious 
dynamos” of the Libyan uprising.113 He, along with the others, constituted Qatar’s “reserve 
army” in the face of Gaddafi’s weak propaganda machine. They were also a sign that 
Qatar’s leverage was transforming from merely constructivist influence to actual political 
power. 
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While Al Jazeera was driven by the same motives that framed its previous 
involvements in Tunisia and Egypt, Al Arabia acted on the base of Saudi Arabia’s all time 
rivalry with the Libyan regime. Libya constituted a perfect space for complimentary efforts 
made by the two channels. Even Egypt’s governmental outlets with their redefined editorial 
policies (after the fall of Mubarak) revealed bias to pro-revolution sentiments. This stance 
was also shown by many Arab networks of news content. Gaddafi openly expressed his 
rage against the networks inciting local opposition against him. His speeches uncovered the 
extent of irritation born out of the challenge posed by new media to his authority. In a video 
aired by the Libyan Television during the first days of the upheaval, he described satellite 
outlets as “stray dogs”, urging Libyans not to believe their allegations about him fleeing 
abroad. 
114
 On the one hand, Gaddafi worked to propagate the idea that media was simply a 
“foreign tool” used to destabilize Libya and introduce occupation, in what seemed to be a 
desperate measure to undermine its effect.
115
 On the other hand, he was concerned with 
preserving his image as a “revolutionary leader” serving the “greatness of Libya” in all his 
broadcasted speeches and TV interviews. 
116
 He was fighting back to defend this 
constructed self image that was greatly shaken by media attacks.  
The media battle was taken to a further extremes when opposing networks – namely 
Al Jazeera went as far as hosting guests calling for Gaddafi’s assassination. In a live 
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interview, the TV’s permanent guest Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradawi, overtly encouraged 
Gaddafi’s close assistants to “kill him and relieve the Libyans from his evil”. 117 The 
regime soon retaliated by targeting the network’s team of correspondents in Libya. Al 
Jazeera’s cameraman Ali Hassan Al-Jaber, who held Qatari nationality, was killed in the 
ambush set near the city of Benghazi. 
118
  
 The media discourse also included international actors. Western media underscored 
the importance of winning the war of information and public opinion against Gaddafi. The 
British Independent expressed its concern about Libyan attempts to establish a correlation 
between NATO’s involvement in Libya and the war on Iraq, in the minds of Arabs and 
Muslims. According to the paper, media wars with Tripoli had to be taken seriously in 
order to prevent the Libyan regime from diverting the course of Arab public opinion that 
was generally sympathetic with the rebels, and paralyze its ability to recruit foreign 
insurgents and jihadists.
119
 
 On the other hand, Libya’s allies defended its stance and accused the United States 
of endorsing campaigns against Gaddafi’s regime in order to prepare the stage for military 
intervention. Deputy of the State Duma of Russia Simeon Bagdasarov warned of schemes 
for military intervention succeeding media escalation. 
120
 Other Russian officials echoed 
concerns suggesting that change in the Arab World and the new balance of power resulting 
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from it are nothing but an orchestrated redesign of the region and its regimes. The Russian 
paper Izvestia quoted one of Moscow’s diplomats saying that America’s waged media war 
is the “electronic Hiroshima of the Middle East121. Such statements were linked to previous 
worries from America’s propagation of “constructive chaos” scenarios in the Arab World. 
Only this time, brute force was not the means to achieve a new Middle Eastern order as it 
was during the Bush administration. New media was the tool used to introduce the 
reordering of geopolitical realities. 
The above demonstrates the layered interaction between various factors presenting 
the shift from media discourse to actual war. Gaddafi’s image was being destroyed by 
media outlets. The “leader” was losing his leverage in the eyes of his supporters, and the 
barriers of fear preventing any opposition from acting were crumbling. New media was 
constructing new collective consciousness, where the “Leader” became part of the past and 
an obstacle to heading towards a better future. This impact was well noticed by the Libyan 
regime. During the uprising, senior reporter of the pro-rebel satellite channel Libya Al-
Ahrar informed the author that security forces in Tripoli would ask children about the 
channels that their parents watch, and “if the answer came to be Al Jazeera or Al Arabia, 
then the result would be their parents’ arrest”.122 The rebel’s morale was also affected by 
broadcasted news and images. Ali Al-Sallabi, the famous Libyan pilot who fought with the 
rebels against Gaddafi’s forces and died defending Ben Ghazi, disobeyed military 
command after being emotionally dragged by the scenes aired on media outlets about the 
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uprising. His brother, Nourideen, affirms that “Ali’s decision was taken after watching 
horrible footage of civilians being crushed by security forces on Al Arabia”.123  
Constructivist tools used to undermine Gaddafi were so powerful that they forced 
him to react with unrestrained power. His rhetoric and tangible policies exposed by media 
outlets in detail were widely unaccepted by Arab public opinion. The latter was to a far 
extent willing to acknowledge the need for limited military intervention, even if it were 
carried out by the NATO. Media discourse managed to change the nature of the struggle 
and reorient its course. After the fall of Gaddafi, the power vacuum in Libya drove 
authorities in neighboring Algeria, Sudan, and Niger to put their military forces on alert. 
Much concern was echoed concerning the reverberations of possible chaos in Libya on the 
regional environment. Even Washington articulated similar concerns pertaining to the 
effect of this on “global terror”.124 The regional and international dimensions were 
intertwined in an unprecedented manner. Bin Jiddo argues that media coverage, especially 
that of Al Jazeera, was similar to that of a regional war: There was simply a decision to 
topple the regime. Libya constituted a laboratory with various challenges and possibilities, 
ranging from national disintegration to Arab political and military engagement in regime 
change.
125
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4.4- In Light of the Libyan Case: What Does Qatar Want? 
In a media conference organized in Abu Dhabi in 2005, the head of the board of 
directors at Al Jazeera, Waddah Khanfar, emphasized the network’s adherence to 
professional guidelines by asserting that it “will not depend on the mood of any particular 
individual, or be influenced by a certain party, and editorial decisions will be taken 
collectively to avoid any unprofessional slips”.126 Al Jazeera’s editorial policies are 
certainly not shaped by individuals. However, they could not have been shaped without 
regard to Qatar’s foreign policy. Bin Jiddo argues that Al Jazeera’s editorial policies were 
reflective of a particular line of thought among Islamists, affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and linked to Qatar’s regional policies in practice. 
The question pertaining to Qatar’s aims and ambitions has elicited much 
controversy. On his blog, American scholar and politician Elliot Abrams raised the 
question of “what does Qatar seek beyond influence, and influence for what?” He argued 
that the dilemma springs from the following: “If one judges by the programming on Al 
Jazeera, the royal family seeks a Middle East where American influence is diminished and 
radical groups are more powerful, but that would be a Middle East with little room for 
fabulously wealthy kings, sheiks, and emirs”. 127 
But perhaps there is another available answer to Elliot’s question. In the case of 
Libya, Al Jazeera’s national organic intellectuals became influential figures in the NTC. 
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Qatar extended its leverage from the public sphere into the political one. It has also been 
proven that the Qataris did not limit their support for rebels to soft power. In September 6, 
two weeks after the fall of Gaddafi, Reuters published a report that cited rebel leaders 
affirming that most of their forces’ weaponry and ammunition were provided by Qatar.128 
The agency’s reporter also said that he has seen boxes delivered to the rebels carrying the 
stamp “Qatar” and containing mortar artilleries and communication devices. Reuters also 
quoted opposition sources suggest that Qatar’s decision to militarily engage in the conflict 
came upon the insistence of Al Jazeera’s regularly hosted Libyan cleric Sheikh Ali Al-
Sallabi, the aforementioned “organic intellectual”. In fact, military assistance was sought by 
the rebels from the early days of the revolution. Deputy President of the National 
Transitional Council, Abdel Hafiz Ghoka, asserted that they were in need of such assistance 
from “friendly states”. When the author interviewed him in Ben Ghazi during the uprising, 
he argued that this matter is of utmost importance for the sake of breaking the status quo on 
the ground. He also emphasized the role of Qatar (among other Gulf States) in providing 
the NTC with political support needed to gain international recognition.
129
 
After the fall of Gaddafi, documents were found in a Libyan intelligence base 
revealing secret meetings which joined Libyan officials to former American diplomat 
David Welsh and Democrat Congressman Dennis Cucinich. According to the documents, 
Welsh told Gaddafi that “Qatar is playing cynical” and that “the media policy adopted by 
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Doha concerning Tripoli aimed to shift attention from developments in Bahrain”.130 
However, a thorough analysis would probably uncover more complex and far-fetched 
interests that the small emirate has tried to maintain. According to Lebanese analyst and 
columnist Sateh Nourideen, Libya “is not being reborn”. What has occurred is in fact “its 
first birth”. The Gaddafi era characterized by the absence of state apparatus and institutions 
was closer to a “sanatorium for the mentally ill” rather than a real state.131 In other words, 
Libya was a void political space waiting to be filled. In the Weekly Standard, Lee Smith 
argues that the Qataris “filled a vacuum in Libya”” and that “the new regional order is 
taking shape round Qatar”. The gulf emirate supplied the rebels with arms, provided means 
for them to export oil, and offered them hundreds of millions of dollars. All this was in 
parallel to the “moral support” given by its “powerful public diplomacy wing” – Al Jazeera. 
After getting the “mission” done, Smith believes that “no one has enjoyed the fruit of the 
Arab Spring more than Qatar”.132 It is the transformation of Al Jazeera’s constructivist role 
into concrete Qatari geopolitical influence. 
 
4.5- Conclusion: 
Al Jazeera has been an efficient tool for redesigning geopolitical realities due to the 
immense effects it had in mobilizing masses and orienting the course of change in Arab 
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states during the Arab popular uprisings. The media battle soon exceeded local implications 
and developed a new regional dimension. As the events took dramatic turns in Libya, Al 
Jazeera moved from playing a role in shaping alternative possibilities on the domestic Arab 
scenes, to affecting the course of regional dynamics and levels of inter-state tensions. This 
research question was addressed in the context of both constructivist and realist 
explanations. It was initially discussed in light of Al Jazeera’s constructivist approach. 
However, Al Jazeera’s role has largely adhered with Qatar’s public diplomacy and vital 
foreign policy – unrestrained by the regional status quo and aiming to balance regional 
powers rather than bandwagon with them. Thus, the wider context of the debate suggests 
that constructivism was a tool used to serve political agendas based on “realpolitik”. Al 
Jazeera as well as other influential media outlets such as Al Arabia, were actually drawing 
the road map for change in turbulent countries. Satellite networks did not only catalyze 
social dynamics and act as providers of information and tools for communication, but also 
played a role in orienting the course of change itself, in a manner that best fits the foreign 
policies of their sponsoring states. 
The next chapter sums up the general findings and conclusions of this thesis. It 
further highlights the relationship between political implications of media rhetoric and 
theories of International Relations. It also sheds light on future prospects and possibilities 
in the field of new media and its relation to foreign policies of Arab States, basing on the 
research and analysis presented in previous chapters.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1- General Findings and Conclusions 
The thesis has mapped a connection between the media industry and Arab politics. 
Satellite channels have been used as instruments serving strategic goals. They have 
influenced and been influenced by the intensely interacting forces on the regional stage. 
The complex discourse evolving during the Arab popular uprisings encompassed dependent 
and independent variables that stem from constructivist approaches and realist drives. It 
reflected a tight connection between domestic and inter-state dynamics in the context of 
clashing interests and opposing foreign policies. Intellectuals also took part in cultivating 
the regional discourse, and hard power replaced soft power in times when social tensions 
introduced bloody strife.  
Popular uprisings in the Arab World triggered various questions pertaining to the 
impact of new media on political developments. Some debates surfacing Arab discourse 
tackled the issue from a reverse angle, whereby the questions raised focused on the 
influence of geopolitical realities on media coverage. The thesis has covered both ends of 
the controversy. On the one hand, it revealed how the intrusion of new media in drawing 
the course of political events allowed it to play a role in shaping their trajectory, in a 
manner that best suits the interests of media-sponsoring states. On the other hand, it 
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explained how the flow of protests from one state to another placed all Arab regimes in the 
circle of danger, including those playing the game of media escalation. Thus, being the 
main media outlet engaging with popular dynamics, Qatar’s Al Jazeera reassessed its 
rhetoric after mass protests reached neighboring Bahrain, yet it pushed for further 
escalation in Libya, Syria, and Yemen; after the encouraging outcomes of its engagement in 
Tunisia and Egypt.  
 
5.2- Back to Theory: Constructivism vs. Realism 
The free system of communication networks has fostered interchanges between 
activists pursuing regime change. Media outlets have served as “institutions of the public 
sphere”133 and were able to involve marginalized social groups in their struggle against 
central authorities. Furthermore, they have been able to structure the framework of conflict 
through their televised intellectuals and politicized rhetoric. In this context, Al Jazeera’s 
increasing influence has revealed the power of constructivist engagements with political 
developments. The discourse that media outlets have created was closely related to the 
power formula in the region. Initially, the term “discourse” is associated with Michel 
Foucault’s “Archeology of Knowledge”, in which he relates representation to relations of 
power. The “interactive” character of new media could be placed within this space of 
interrelation,
134
 whereby perceptions drawn by televised images serve the creation of a new 
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approach to the struggle for power in the Arab World. In this regard, scholars have 
emphasized the “democratic potential” and “creative management” of interactivity, and 
introduced “the long standing question of whether or not a media technology has the power 
to determine culture and society”.135 New media has invested in this formula extensively. In 
Tunisia and Egypt, public opinion constituted a potential force against established status 
quos. Its high inclinations and drives for mobility were created by political, social, and 
economic factors, yet they were greatly fueled by media discourse. Later on, Qatar’s 
constructivist policy was translated into realist actions in Libya, where force replaced soft 
power, and direct intervention substituted its past circuitous attempts to support the popular 
uprising. When constructivist tactics introduce realist action, this indicates that both 
approaches have been necessary to achieve the results desired by the states presenting them. 
Had direct intervention in Libya been not preceded by preparatory media escalation, it 
would not have produced the same effect. 
A dilemma surfaced in Arab public discourse when the tide of peaceful change first 
reached a dead end in Libya, and calls for foreign military intervention became a substance 
for debate. The Libyan case underscored the predicament relating to the legitimacy of 
intervention versus calls for protecting human rights and promoting democracy. As 
opposed to the case of Iraq seven years in advance, Arab public opinion, shaped by media 
discourse, did not widely oppose the option of foreign involvement. This added a new 
variable to the entangled formula relating the public sphere to political interest, and 
constructivist approaches to realist ones. 
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5.3- Future Prospects: Media Maintains its Role 
 The drastic changes in the Arab region will be vigorously interacting for the 
following years to come. The Arab scene will be crystallizing along with the continuously 
evolving interplay between media and politics. Previously, it has been said that the “Arab 
public sphere affects international politics in three ways: by changing the strategic 
calculations of rational politicians, by shaping worldwide views, and by transforming 
identities.”136 However, what we have witnessed during the uprisings was a direct 
intervention of the public sphere in introducing alternative domestic governance and 
drawing different geopolitical possibilities (as in the cases of Libya, Yemen, and Syria). Al 
Jazeera’s discourse is no more just a “verbalization of Arab publics’ critiques of 
government.”137 It is rather an introductory stage to more tangible policies based on realist 
agendas. New media in general and Al Jazeera in particular have proved to be “one of the 
most important de facto Arab political parties”,138 and have presented themselves as a main 
player in the evolving Arab political space. It might be true that “credibility, audience size, 
and financial resources will serve as the essential criteria for the survivability of Al 
Jazeera”.139 However, present signs suggest that survivability isn’t the real question. It is 
rather believed that the future will further reveal media’s role in unveiling the 
transformative possibilities enticing social change. 
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So far, new media has reserved a place in the newly designed Arab region. 
Accordingly, more attention will be given to this field. Some regional actors seem to have 
realized that their engagement with the Arab public sphere is in need of maintenance, or of 
additional players participating in media discourse. The establishment of new networks can 
be read within this context. In 2012, a number of news outlets will be launched including 
Al Mayadeen – headed by Ghassan Bin Jiddo and closely related to Iran and its Arab allies, 
Al Arab – founded by the Saudi billionaire Al Walid Bin Talal and constituting a Saudi 
compliment to Al Arabia, in addition to the Arabic version of Sky News. This relates to the 
conviction that the role of new media during Arab popular uprisings was highly 
transformative, and its upcoming prospects are yet to be uncovered. Arabic speaking new 
media has been an agent exploring alternatives and projecting them on the geopolitical 
landscape, and will continue to do so in the near future. 
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